I don’t see Ignatieff’s proposal as significantly different from what Jack Layton said, and I expect they can agree on a composite. However, I may be mistaken: perhaps Ignatieff’s proposal needs to be improved, as Scott implies.

I see no constitutional issue. Every law binds the Governor-General-In-Council (the cabinet). No one has suggested the new rule should affect the GG’s reserve power to refuse prorogation in extraordinary circumstances — although that reserve power would never be needed if the House had to approve prorogation.

I personally don’t want to limit the discussion to prorogation. I favour the German rule that early dissolution requires a vote of the House. Our so-called fixed date election law can be amended so it means what it seems to say. We would then have a rule that anyone can understand: the House adjourns, prorogues and dissolves by its own motion.

That’s actually my main concern: simplicity. We saw 13 months ago that huge numbers of Canadians don’t understand the parliamentary system. This is partly the fault of the news media who rush to be the first to declare “who won?” on election night, even when the right answer is “no majority” or as the British news media say “no overall control” as they commonly say of municipal elections run on party labels.

So if it’s not simple, the news media will over-simplify it and confuse the public — again.

In my opinion, the problem is not prorogation alone. It’s the selection of our governor-general. Who chooses this person? Officially, it’s the Queen; unofficially, it’s the prime minister. Should parliament select the governor-general/president or should Canadians vote for a president? Should we just keep the same system? Today’s GG is only responsible to the Queen. Should we have an executive leader responsible to parliament or Canadian citizens directly?

Harper, with that law, seems to agree that the PM can be forced to use his powers by Parliament, which is the same as limiting his power. So it may be possible to limit how the PM uses prorogation.

The problem is, what if the PM asks anyway? The GG can’t be bound by an Act of Parliament.

There has to be an enforceable penalty.

Adding provisions preventing the government from amending the Parliamentary calendar without near unanimous consent would prevent the government from recessing the House to avoid facing the opposition.

That being said I do not think you can really constitutionalize or even legislate that a government not abuse the prorogation power because it is not so much a matter of what they do but why they do it. That is why we give the GG discretionary power.

What we need is a constitutional convention that when there is a conflict between the wishes of the Prime Minister and a majority of the House of Commons, that the wishes of House of Commons (as made known to the GG in any way) must prevail.

1. More than a year has passed since the last throne speech, AND

2. The prorogation is for no more than a month, AND

3. No confidence matter has been scheduled, AND

4. The Prime Minister has given 10 days written notice with reasons, AND

5. The House has had the opportunity for a full debate (but not a vote.)

All those conditions would rarely be met. I would think it simpler to just require the consent of the House in all cases. But the exception seems harmless enough that I’m not that concerned, at first glance. But I stand to be corrected. If the exception is so harmless, why even bother with it?

Isn’t that rub though Scott? These proposals force the government into the open, they must justify proroguing and all the implications. Public opinion is a key consideration, if the government knows scrutiny awaits, a slower process that allows Canadians to digest the rationale, they better have good reasons. For instance, this prorogue never happens if these rules were in place. Imagine the opposition, imagine the debate, they wouldn’t even consider. Harper tried to hide this prorogue with the new year’s eve decision, he didn’t want any light of day.

As for majorities, I’m not sure what you do there. At the very least, the government still must bring its reasoning forth, but ultimately they have the power. It still protects a basic premise about our democracy, namely the majority rules.